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Abstract 
Equally at national and the highest international levels, few issues in technology governance are more vexed 
than those around the precautionary principle. Often using colourful rhetoric – and frequently paying scant 
attention to the substantive form taken by precaution in any given setting, even ostensibly academic analyses 
accuse precautionary approaches of being ‘dangerous’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘capricious’ and ‘irrational’ – somehow 
serving indiscriminately to ‘stifle discovery’,  ‘suppress innovation’ and foster an 'anti-technology’ climate. The 
widely advocated alternative is ‘science based’ risk assessment – under which single aggregated probabilities 
are assigned to supposedly definitively-characterised possibilities and asserted to offer sufficient representations 
of the many intractable dimensions of uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance. The high economic and political 
stakes combine with their expediency to entrenched institutional and technological interests, to intensify these 
arguments. Amidst all the noise, it is easy to miss the more balanced, reasonable realities of precaution. 
By reference to a large literature on all sides of these debates, this paper shows how these pressures are not only 
misleading, but themselves seriously unscientific – leading to potentially grave vulnerabilities. Experience over 
more than a century in technology governance, shows that the dominant issues are not about calculation of 
probabilities, but about the effects of power in innovation and regulatory systems, the need for balanced 
consideration of alternative options, scrutinising claimed benefits as much as alleged risks and always being 
vigilant for the ever-present possibility of surprise. In this light, it is not rational to assert that incertitudes of 
many difficult kinds must always take the convenient forms susceptible to risk assessment. To invoke the name 
of science as a whole, in seeking to force such practices, is gravely undermining of science itself. And these 
pressures also seriously misrepresent the nature of innovation processes, in which the branching evolutionary 
dynamic means that concerns over particular trajectories simply help to favour alternative innovation pathways.  
Precaution is about steering innovation, not blocking it. It is not necessarily about ‘banning’ anything, but 
simply taking the time and effort to gather deeper and more relevant information and consider wider options. 
Under conditions of incertitude to which risk assessment is – even under its own definition – quite simply 
inapplicable, precaution offers a means to build more robust understandings of the implications of divergent 
views of the world and more diverse possibilities for action. Of course, like risk assessment, precaution is 
sometimes implemented in mistaken or exaggerated ways. But the reason such a sensible, measured approach is 
the object of such intense general criticism, has more to do with the pervasive imprints of power in and around 
conventional regulatory processes, than it does with any intrinsic features of precaution itself. Whilst partisan 
lobbying is legitimate in a democracy as a way to advance narrow sectoral interests, it is unfortunate when such 
rhetorics seek spuriously to don the clothing of disinterested science and reason in the public interest.  
Taking the best of all approaches, this paper ends by outlining a general framework under which more rigorous 
and comprehensive precautionary forms of appraisal, can be reconciled with risk-based approaches under 
conditions where these remain applicable. A number of practical implications arise for innovation and 
regulatory policy alike, spanning many different sectors of emerging technologies. In the end, precaution is 
identified to be about escaping from technocratic capture under which sectoral interests use narrow risk 
assessment to force particular views of the world. What precaution offers to enable instead is more democratic 
choice under ever-present uncertainties, over the best directions to be taken by innovation in any given field. 
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Introduction 
Worldwide and at every level, institutions concerned with technology governance are not short of 
pressing social, environmental and health challenges. Ever more potent new convergences are 
occurring between revolutionary developments in individual areas of science and technology, that 
together present prospects that are even less predictable than the many radical surprises of the past. 
Areas of accelerating technological change include synthetic biology [1] and gene editing [2]; 
nanotechnology and new materials [3]; neuroscience [4] and cognitive enhancement [5]; artificial 
intelligence and autonomous robotics [6]; climate geoengineering [7] and planetary management 
[8]. 
These technological trends take place amidst intensifying pre-existing inequalities and 
vulnerabilities [9], affected by longstanding accumulations of toxic and nuclear pollution [10] and 
compounded by climate change and other forms of ecological destruction [11]. Interacting with 
new geopolitical tensions [12] and many other dynamic changes in encompassing economies and 
social contexts [13], formidable challenges are presented for conventional regulatory practices 
[14]. In particular, what results from these trends and interactions is an array of radical 
uncertainties [15]. Equally surrounding future, current (and even historic) developments [16] and 
recognised in diverse forms and degrees [17], these uncertainties arise in a multitude of sources 
[18], involving divergent perspectives as well as unknown outcomes [19] and implicating potential 
benefits as much as risks [20].  
Acknowledging that conventional methods of regulatory risk assessment address only restricted 
aspects of these challenges [21], a variety of understandings of ‘precaution’ have come to the fore as 
a response [22]. Among the many disciplines in which active discussions have focused in some 
depth on different aspects, are: environmental [23] and social science [24]; market [25] and 
ecological economics [26][27]; science and technology studies [28] and political theory [29]; and 
communications research [30] and management studies [31]. As a result, diverse versions of the 
concept of precaution feature prominently in risk regulation [32], and innovation policy [33] as 
well as mainstream political discourse [34].  
When combined with the multiplicity of traditions and contexts in international jurisprudence [35], 
it is hardly surprising that – just as a variety of practises have evolved in regulatory risk assessment 
[36] – so too there has grown up a diversity of forms for associated formalisations of ‘the’ 
precautionary principle [32]. Variously embodied in ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ law [37], many 
differences of detail have emerged in proliferating international instruments [38] and across 
contrasting national jurisdictions [39]. This diversity of detail is enhanced by the range of 
regulatory sectors in which different versions of the precautionary principle have developed, 
including food safety [40] [41], chemicals regulation [42], genetic modification [43], 
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telecommunications [44], nanotechnology [45], climate change [46], conservation [47]  and 
general health protection [48]. 
Despite this complexity and diversity, however, a coherent summary story can nonetheless be told 
concerning the broad development of ‘the’ precautionary principle [38]. Originating in the earliest 
international initiatives for environmental protection in the 1970s, it first came to legal maturity in 
the ‘vorsorgeprinzip’ of German environmental policy in the 1980’s [49]. In the rising tide of 
environmentalism in that period [50], the precautionary principle was championed by 
environmentalists and public health advocates – and so established at an early stage in a series of the 
most actively contested global environmental conventions [51], culminating in the Rio Convention 
on Sustainable Development of 1992[52]. This burgeoning growth led to strong resistance by some 
of the industries most under pressure in these fora [23], with the precautionary principle becoming 
particularly controversial in the USA [53]. Despite a more complex picture at a detailed level 
between different jurisdictions and between ‘political’ and ‘legal’ arenas [54], precaution grew 
especially firmly established in Europe in the 1990s [55]. Here, the precautionary principle moved 
from a guiding theme in European Commission (EC) environmental policy [56], to become a 
general principle of EC law [57]. With the transatlantic contrasts in this story at the centre of 
wider global contentions on various high stakes economic and industrial issues, precaution then 
became a repeated focus of attention in a series of noisy international trade disputes [58][59]. 
Across all these settings, contention focused especially intensively on the role of science in the 
precautionary principle [60][61].   
With more recent worldwide growth in practices of ‘evidence based policy’ [62][63], the challenges 
posed by scientific uncertainties have become increasingly salient – and uncomfortable. Although 
one reaction is to diminish or deny the inconvenient intractabilities of uncertainty to which 
precaution is a response, another is to seek to address them more fully and openly. It is under these 
latter imperatives, that influence of the precautionary principle has extended, expanding from 
environmental regulation [64], to wider policy making on issues of health [23], risk [65], science 
[60], innovation [66], emerging technologies [67]  and world trade [68].  
But at the same time, the significance of the worldwide establishment of precaution has also been 
widely discussed in relation to diverse wider social issues ranging from inequalities and collective 
action [69] and the nature of irreversibility in politics [70], to ‘degrowth’ visions in  economics 
[71], practices of health and psychiatric care [72] and co-operative transdisciplinary research [73]. 
As associated issues have mushroomed in scope, so the theme of precaution has grown in profile and 
authority and in its general implications for the governance not only of science and technology, but 
of wider social issues [74]. 
This chapter will review global policy debates over the relevance of precaution for risk regulation 
and wider technology governance and assess some practical policy implications. The next section 
summarises some of the key background issues bearing on discussions of the precautionary principle. 
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This is followed by an evaluation of some of the principal concerns that have been raised in different 
quarters. Although (like risk regulation more generally) raising many queries, the precautionary 
principle does emerge in general terms as a robust response to the kind and degrees of uncertainty 
discussed in this introduction – that have been recognised in so many different areas and 
perspectives as going beyond the limits of conventional forms of regulatory risk assessment.  
The paper closes by considering some of the practical repercussions for regulatory appraisal –
identifying a variety of readily-implemented appraisal methods that are often neglected where 
governance institutions remain unduly wedded to simplified notions of risk. In order to substantiate 
some specific possible implications for regulating issues like those with which this chapter began, the 
discussion ends by briefly describing a general framework for implementing precautionary forms of 
regulatory appraisal, which are at the same time operational and avoid the pitfalls of conventional 
over-reliance on risk assessment. 
 
General Underlying Issues Around the Precautionary Principle 
As mentioned above, a widely influential early formulation of the precautionary principle was 
provided in the United Nations 1992 Rio Declaration. This formulation is especially relevant, 
because it has been accepted by more states than any other – including some of the more sceptical 
jurisdictions like the USA [75]. Here, Principle 15 states that: “Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation” [52]. This is sometimes glossed as an injunction, to 
“look before you leap” [65] or remember “it is better to be safe than sorry” [76]. Other versions of the 
principle are variously rated to be weaker or stricter [77], with ‘strong precaution’ sometimes 
characterised (by supporters as well as detractors) as a blanket reversal of ‘the burden of proof’ away 
from critics and towards proponents of a regulated activity [78]. Some of these issues will be 
discussed shortly. For now, the simple wording and canonical status of Rio Principle 15 nicely 
exemplifies four key (and quite essential) features of a majority of versions of the precautionary 
principle, which can be seen to be central to the bulk of the debate. 
First, precaution is not indiscriminate, but hinges on the presence of particular properties in decision 
making, notably (in Rio Principle 15): a potential for particularly serious or irreversible harm under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty [79].  
Second, precaution is not open-ended, but rests on a clear normative presumption in favour of 
particular values or qualities like the environment or human health (rather than, for instance: 
economic, sectoral, or partisan institutional interests) [80].  
Third, precaution is not simply about acting to stop something, but introduces instead a 
responsibility for more careful and explicit reasoning over what kinds of action might be 
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appropriate. So, it is about reinforcing qualities of understanding deliberation and accountability, 
rather than just the stringency of the resulting actions [81].  
Fourth, precaution is not in itself biased, but applies symmetrically to all decision alternatives in any 
given context (including ‘doing nothing’). Like risk assessment (but in ways that the focus on 
uncertainty does more to encourage), it is most rigorous when implemented in a balanced 
comparative way with respect to a full range of policy options [82][53]. 
 
In these terms, the precautionary principle can be seen as a succinct distillation of more than a 
century of experience with the unexpected consequences of new knowledges, technologies and 
associated social innovations [83]. In particular (and unlike idealised notions of ‘sound scientific’ 
risk assessment), it embodies an awareness of the asymmetries and inequalities of the power 
relationships that bear on processes of regulatory appraisal and help to shape the fabrics of the 
knowledges produced within them [84].  
As such, precaution bears a close relationship with other parallel principles (with which it is 
sometimes compared), like those concerning ‘prevention’ [85], ‘polluter pays’ [86], ‘no regrets’ [87], 
‘participation’ [88], ‘substitution’ [89] and ‘clean production’ [90]. Like these, precaution serves to 
enrich and reinforce appreciations for duties of care on the part of commercial firms and the 
protective responsibilities of sovereign governments and regulatory administrations [45] [91]. In 
short, the precautionary principle requires more explicit, scientifically rigorous and socially-
sophisticated attention to the implications of incomplete knowledge, than is routinely provided in 
the conventional regulatory assessment of ‘risk’ [16][92]. 
 
Some Key Criticisms and Responses 
Given the nature of the issues and the powerful interests at stake, the precautionary principle has 
been subject to some quite vehement rhetorical criticism [93][94][95]. One frequent concern is 
that it is ill-defined. In the Rio formulation, for instance, how serious is ‘serious’? What exactly does 
‘irreversible’ mean? Does ‘full scientific certainty’ ever exist? Such concerns seem well-founded if the 
precautionary principle is presented as a sufficient, comprehensive or definitive procedural rule. Yet 
legal scholars point out that (as with any general legal principle like ‘proportionality’ or ‘cost 
effectiveness’), no given wording of precaution can in itself be entirely self-sufficient as a decision rule 
[59]. Nor is precaution typically presented as such [32]. Just as these other principles rely on 
specific methods and procedures (e.g. risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis) in order to make them 
operational, so too is any application of the precautionary principle simply a framework for the 
development and application of more detailed complementary practices [96]. This point is returned 
to at the end of this chapter. 
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A further criticism is that the explicitly normative character of the precautionary principle somehow 
renders it ‘irrational’ [97] or ‘unscientific’ [98]. In one form, this concern rests on the (usually 
implicit) assumption that conventional ‘science based’ regulatory procedures manage somehow to 
transcend normative content [84]. However, this neglects the ways in which practical applications 
of methods like risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis also require inherent exercise of evaluative 
judgements [99]. For instance, values are intrinsic to the setting of levels of protection in risk 
assessment, the weighing of different forms of harm and their balancing with countervailing benefits 
[100]. 
 
Beyond this, an extensive literature documents how the claimed ‘sound scientific’ methods so often 
contrasted with precaution, are typically subject to serious uncertainties concerning divergent 
possible ‘framings’ [99]. As a consequence, ‘evidence based’ results obtained in areas such as energy 
[101], chemicals [102], genetic modification [103] and industrial regulation [104] often display 
strong sensitivity to assumptions, that can vary radically across different equally-authoritative 
studies [33]. When all analysis is acknowledged necessarily to be subject to such framing by value 
judgements, then it emerges that the more explicit normativity of the precautionary principle is 
actually more, rather than less, reasonable and accountable [100]. As illuminated by other critiques 
of the fact-value dichotomy [105], what is irrational, is denial by many critics of the precautionary 
principle – even if only implied – that there are inherent normativities in all risk assessment.  
It is on the basis of this normative orientation, however, that there remains (for those so inclined) 
scope for criticism of the precautionary principle simply on the overtly political grounds that it 
addresses general concerns like environment and human health, rather than  more private interests 
like commercial profit or the fate of a particular kind of technology [97][106]. Such partisanship is 
understandable given the high stakes involved in many regulatory arenas where precaution comes to 
be discussed. But it is not defensible on the part of those who wish to be regarded as neutral 
regulators or dispassionate scholars, to seek to stigmatise precaution as being somehow self-
evidently ‘unreasonable’.  
It is a grave feature of precaution debates worldwide, then, that such partisan polemics against 
precaution are so often and loudly voiced in the ostensible name of academic independence or ‘sound 
science’ [107]. Whatever position might legitimately be taken on the prioritising of values or 
importance of uncertainty, to reject out of hand the reasoned basis for precaution is (for reasons that 
will be further explored below) not only ironically irrational, but profoundly anti-democratic [66]. 
These kinds of debates between contending political values are entirely legitimate in technology 
regulation. What is problematic, is where the political content is suppressed and dressed up in the 
ostensible “neutrality” of science [108]. Yet here, there is a key general rationale for the 
precautionary principle that can be appreciated even by those who might otherwise be sceptical. 
 7 
This lies simply in understanding the ever-present politics around technologies, health and 
environment, in which contending interests across different sectors seek to assert their own most 
expedient framings as if these were the singular definitive representations of science [109].  
This is not a partisan point, it occurs on all sides of regulatory debates. What is crucial to realise, 
however, is that it is by definition incumbent interests (of whatever kind) that are most likely in the 
position of ‘capturing’ regulation with their own particular framings [110]. Highly instrumental 
interpretations of uncertainty have featured prominently, for instance, in regulatory histories in 
areas like asbestos, benzene, thalidomide, dioxins, lead in petrol, tobacco, many pesticides, mercury, 
chlorine and endocrine-disrupting compounds, as well as chlorofluorocarbons, high sulphur fuels 
and fossil fuels in general [83][92]. The point here is not that incumbency is somehow of itself a 
bad thing, but that it has consequences for regulatory understandings as well as actions, that it 
would not be rational to dismiss. 
In this bigger and more pluralistic picture, then, the precautionary principle can be recognised 
simply as a means to resist over-privileged incumbency where it occurs and restore a more 
reasonable balance of interests in regulatory appraisal [96]. In any event, adoption of the 
precautionary principle does not necessarily negate the possibility that other normative values 
might be applied elsewhere in a regulatory process – such as prioritisation of profit, employment or 
GDP. All it does, is help ensure that – where scientific knowledge is insufficient under conditions of 
uncertainty to settle a regulatory issue on its own – then decisions will be subject to more explicitly 
open deliberation and argument about which values to prioritise [16][100]. 
A related set of concerns focus on other political implications of precaution. Cases are sometimes 
cited in which precaution itself appears to have been applied in an inconsistent or expedient fashion, 
to achieve outcomes that are actually pursued for rather different reasons [111]. An example might 
be the rejection of technologies that are disfavoured by particular influential interests or the 
protection of national industries from international trade competition [112]. At one level, this 
simply highlights a general tendency found on all sides in the real-world politics of technology. 
Reasonable advocacy should acknowledge that the precautionary principle is no more intrinsically 
immune to manipulation than any other principle. For example, a principle of rational utility 
maximisation in risk assessment can also often end up asserting particular partisan framings as if 
these were synonymous with ‘rationality’ [96]. Such dynamics played a prominent part in many 
regulatory histories like those mentioned above [83], [92][8]. It is irrational to single out 
precaution for particular criticism on these grounds.  
However, there do nonetheless remain reasonable grounds for concern in cases where the 
precautionary principle is invoked in an opaque or discriminatory way [100]. For instance, 
imposing precaution selectively on particular policy options, whilst not doing so to alternative 
options (including ‘business as usual’) is illegitimate. Where this occurs, perverse environmental or 
health outcomes may arise [97][100]. However, the fact that different versions of the precautionary 
 8 
principle apply symmetrically across all decision options in any given context, means that this is 
clearly not an inherent fault of precaution per se, but a matter of inadequate application [96]. Here, 
both critics and proponents of the precautionary principle hold common ground, in aiming for a 
situation in which the particular methods adopted in the implementation of regulatory appraisal are 
more rigorous, systematic and transparent about challenges of incomplete knowledge and 
potentially irreversible harm, than is typically currently the case in established practice of 
regulatory assessment [96][99][100] 
There are also many loudly-voiced, but typically under-substantiated, assertions that precaution can 
be motivated by, or might lead to, a blanket rejection of all new technologies [97]. This is the point 
underlying increasing rhetorics around ‘permissionless innovation’ [114], or various kinds of 
‘proactionary’ [115][116][117] or ‘innovation’ principle [118]. Although legitimate rhetorical 
interventions by particular industrial interests or their lobbyists [119], it is difficult to justify how 
such relatively casual concepts can be propounded on a par with the outcomes of decades of 
cumulative rigorous adversarial negotiation and authoritative judicial practice that are embodied in 
the various forms of the precautionary principle.  
A more serious problem here, though, is that these kinds of political move involve fundamental 
misrepresentations not only of precaution, but also of the nature of innovation itself [99][33]. It is 
easy to explain why. First, precaution focuses on the reasons for intervening, and carries no 
necessary implications for the substance or stringency of the interventions themselves [39]. Rather 
than bans or phase-outs, precautionary actions may as readily take the form of strengthened 
standards, containment strategies, licensing arrangements, monitoring measures, labelling 
requirements, liability provisions or compensation schemes [96].  
Second, general ‘anti-innovation’ accusations fail to address the fundamental point that technological 
and social change are branching evolutionary processes [120]. As repeatedly shown in the 
application of precaution, the inhibition of one particular trajectory (e.g., nuclear power or 
genetically modified organisms) becomes an advantage for another (e.g., renewables or marker 
assisted breeding) [83][121]. Precaution is about steering, not stopping, innovation [66]. In this 
sense, precaution can actually offer to help reconcile tensions between political pressures for 
promotion and control [122]. The selective branding of specific concerns over particular 
technologies as if they represent an undifferentiated general ‘anti’ technology position can on these 
dispassionate grounds be recognised simply as polemics – legitimate expressions of partisan political 
views, but not credible as a full or fair characterisation of these important issues. 
 
Precaution and the Nature of Uncertainty 
Perhaps the most important practical feature of all these critical debates, is a recognition that the 
substantive significance of the precautionary principle rests largely in the specific institutional 
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frameworks, deliberative procedures and analytical methods through which it is implemented. In 
other words, precaution is more important as an epistemic and deliberative process, than as a 
supposedly self-sufficient ‘decision rule’ [96][123][37].  
With the precautionary principle as a cue to such a process, a key ensuing purpose is to help address 
the recognised lack of scientific certainty by expending more effort in hedging against unknown 
possibilities and investing in ‘social learning’—exploring a wider and deeper array of salient types of 
knowledge than would normally be engaged with [16][24][96]. Much of the ostensible support 
currently afforded to the precautionary principle by governmental bodies—like that sporadically 
offered by the European Commission in the past—is explicitly predicated on the qualification that 
precaution is purely a risk ‘management’ (rather than an ‘assessment’) measure [56]. When the 
implications of precaution are understood for processes of regulatory appraisal, however, it can be 
seen that such a position threatens to undermine the real logic and value of precautionary responses 
to strong uncertainty [124]. Precaution is as much about appraising threats as managing them. 
This point is also relevant to arguments that precaution is somehow ‘un-’ or ‘anti-scientific’ [97]. In 
short, these involve assumptions that ‘sound scientific’ regulation is synonymous with application of 
a narrow set of techniques based around probabilistic analysis, which treat all uncertainties in 
conveniently reduced and aggregated quantitative terms, as if they were ‘risk’ [109]. This is 
perhaps the most serious of all misrepresentations around the precautionary principle. Precaution is 
not a cause of uncertainty, but a response to it. Where they are given a chance, different versions of 
the precautionary principle simply remind that it is often necessary to move beyond the usual 
exclusive reliance on conventional risk assessment. What is irrational and unscientific, is to react to 
this predicament by rejecting precaution itself and denying that the real nature of uncertainty is that 
it cannot be reduced merely to probabilities [96].  
The reasons for this can be appreciated by considering Figure 1. This is structured according to the 
two parameters that shape conventional risk assessment. First (on the horizontal axis), there are the 
magnitudes of the things that may happen (‘hazards’, ‘possibilities’ or ‘outcomes’). Second (on the 
vertical axis), there are the likelihoods (or probabilities) associated with each. In mainstream risk 
assessment, these are each aggregated across a diversity of relevant dimensions, contexts, 
aetiologies and perspectives and then multiplied together. Attention thereby moves to the top left of 
the diagram. This confident ‘reductive aggregative’ style [109], expressed in an apparently 
authoritative quantitative idiom, lends itself to assertive disciplinary or political agendas [99]. But 
the resulting political body language side-lines and implicitly denies deeper conditions of incertitude 
lying in the lower and right-hand fields[24], under which probabilities (in the words of the 
probability theorist de Finetti simply “do not exist” [127]. Through this process of “organised 
irresponsibility” [125], those actors driving particular kinds of development can hope effectively to 
externalise possible adverse consequences onto others. 
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 [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The bottom line here is that the focus of precaution on ‘lack of scientific certainty’, points to the 
necessity for different kinds of regulatory appraisal methods, processes and practices under forms of 
incertitude that are not addressed by risk assessment. Where these are held to be applicable, they are 
not necessarily exclusive alternatives to risk assessment, but can be supplemental to it in ways that 
take responsibility for these wider issues [126]. Here, an especially significant contribution has been 
made by an extensive literature in the social and policy analysis of science [24][74]. Offering 
pioneering explorations of the contrasting aspects of incertitude illustrated schematically in Figure 
1, this literature points to a range of rigorous responses that avoid the kind of ‘pretence at certainty’ 
that can come with conventional risk assessment [127].  
 
Starting with the strict state of ‘uncertainty’ in the lower left hand quadrant of Figure 1, the term 
itself was introduced in this sense nearly a century ago by the economists Knight and Keynes 
[128][129]. Much elaborated since, this definition makes very clear the difference between 
‘uncertainty’ and the relatively tractable state of ‘risk’ – under which it is held to be possible 
confidently to determine both the probabilities and the magnitudes of contending forms of benefit 
and harm [99]. Under Knight’s more intractable state of uncertainty, there may be confidence in 
characterising a range of possible outcomes, but the available empirical information or analytical 
models simply do not present a definitive basis for deriving a single aggregated representation of 
probabilities [109].  
This prompts consideration of the further contrasting condition addressed in the top right of Figure 
1, which might most straightforwardly be called ambiguity [96]. This is where it is the 
characterisation of outcomes that is problematic, rather than the probabilities. Ambiguity arises 
where there are ‘contradictory certainties’ [130], applying even to outcomes that have occurred 
already. Disagreements may persist, for instance, over the selection, partitioning, bounding, 
measurement, prioritisation, interpretation and aggregation of different forms or understandings of 
benefit or harm [109]. Where there are multiple divergent values, foundational work in rational 
choice theory has shown that the assertion of a single aggregated preference function – implicitly 
central to conventional regulatory risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis – is itself a deeply 
irrational aim to strive for, let alone claim [131]. In a plural society, then, the idea of a single 
definitive ‘sound scientific’ resolution to regulatory challenges is an oxymoronic contradiction in 
terms [132]. 
What Figure 1 also shows, is that there lies beyond (below and to the right) of both uncertainty and 
ambiguity, the even less tractable predicament of ignorance. Here (where it is recognised that 
neither probabilities nor outcomes can be fully characterised [133]), ignorance  involves recognition 
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that “we don’t know what we don’t know” [24]. It is an acknowledgement of the ever-present 
prospect of ‘surprise’ [134]. Crucially, of course, surprises can be positive as well as ‘nasty’ [135]. 
But it is central to the predicaments of regulation, that some of the most iconic environmental and 
health issues of recent years (like stratospheric ozone depletion [83], BSE [136] and endocrine 
disrupting chemicals [137]), were not simply matters of mistakenly optimistic calculations of 
probability or magnitude. It was the formative mechanisms and outcomes themselves that were 
unexpected – thus denying knowledge of the parameters necessary even to structure risk 
assessment, let alone perform the calculations [109].  
The point in distinguishing these contrasting aspects of incertitude is not to assert particular 
terminologies. In a vast and complex literature, each of the terms in Figure 1 can be used in 
radically divergent ways. The point here – for the purpose of illustrating practical precautionary 
responses – is simply to emphasise the diversity of contexts. In practice, of course, these four ‘ideal-
typical’ states of knowledge typically occur together. The scheme is thus not a taxonomy, but a 
heuristic distinction between different aspects of incertitude [109], each spanning a variety of 
specific causes, settings and implications. What each aspect is called, is secondary. But what is 
crucial, is to avoid the present situation in much everyday regulatory practice reliant on risk 
assessment, in which all forms of incertitude beyond probabilistic risk are effectively excluded and 
denied even a name. With even the most basic recognition for the real nature of uncertainty thereby 
so often and deeply undermined, it is hardly surprising that precaution as a response should so 
frequently be so badly misunderstood.  
To sum up, what is typically neglected in conventional risk assessment, then, is that both 
magnitudes and probabilities may each be subject to variously incomplete or problematic knowledge, 
of kinds that are (by definition) not susceptible to probabilistic analysis [16]. This is why it is 
mistaken to seek to address precaution in probabilistic or statistical terms [138]. This is why it is 
illogical to imply – as does much of the European legal apparatus on precaution – that precaution 
can be secondary and subordinate to risk assessment [56][139]. Under conditions where it is by 
definition not rigorously possible to neatly quantify singular scalar values for risks and benefits and 
balance them against each other, to insist that this nonetheless be performed, represents a triumph 
of ideology over realism.  
It implies no slur on intelligence or integrity, to note the prevalence of such flawed processes in 
regulatory appraisal.  It is in exactly the above spirit of rigour and realism, that it must be 
acknowledged that powerful pressures nonetheless serve to force otherwise reasonable actors to put 
on this kind performance. The ‘real world’ of political demand for conveniently simple justifications, 
is in deep tension with the ‘real real world’ of the fundamentally under-determined natural and 
physical processes themselves. Such are the vulnerabilities, that it is entirely rational in apolitical 
sense to seek various kinds of reduction and closure that are not actually warranted in scientific 
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terms [99], This is the way in which it might be hoped that justification be secured for decisions 
[140], trust fostered [141], acceptance procured [142] and blame managed [143].  
Regulatory reliance on forms of risk assessment that generate unrealistically singular aggregated 
pictures of probabilities and magnitudes, has the effect not only of misleading decision-making, but 
also of concealing these underlying pressures. Where these politically-driven practices of reduction 
and aggregation are justified in rhetorics of ‘sound science’, the pathology is compounded [99]. 
What is threatened is not just the efficacy of the regulatory process, but the integrity and cultural 
standing of science itself. In response to this, different versions of the precautionary principle hold in 
common that they: resist strong political pressures to deprecate possibilities of serious or 
irreversible harm; promote more careful and deliberate forms of reasoning in the face of uncertainty; 
are more explicit and accountable in their normativity in the face of ambiguity; and prioritise the 
benefits of attending to diverse alternative actions in the face of ignorance. Despite the many 
undoubted flaws and shortcomings of real-world instantiations of precautionary practice, it is these 
qualities that offer to join with other principles of rigour in regulation, to mitigate some of the 
otherwise corrosive political pressures. 
Fortunately, there is no shortage of operational practices by means of which to implement these 
more precautionary responses to the less tractable aspects of incertitude outlined in Figure 1. A key 
feature of these precautionary methods highlighted lower down and to the right of the picture, is 
that they are less reductive or aggregative than those that are appropriate under the strict condition 
of ‘risk’ in the upper left. However, these more precautionary alternatives are no less systematic or 
‘scientific’ in nature than is risk assessment. By drawing attention to this diversity of practical 
responses in appraisal, the direct relevance of precaution can more readily be appreciated, not just to 
the management but also to the appraisal of ‘risk’.  
Precaution can thereby be seen to hold important implications not just for risk management (where 
it is so often confined in regulation [56]), but also for policy appraisal. Indeed, the methods shown 
under uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance in Figure 1 are not only consistent with ‘’sound 
scientific’ practice, but are actually more rigorous than is risk assessment under these particular 
conditions, in their resistance to pretence at knowledge [16][24][96]. Crucially, however, risk 
assessment techniques remain applicable under specific conditions where they apply – for familiar 
deterministic systems where there this confidence that probabilistic calculus is sufficient.  
This said, none of this negates that precaution can also be relevant in particular ways under narrow 
conditions of risk. Different versions of the precautionary principle can still hold important 
implications for evaluative aspects of regulatory dilemmas, such as the setting of levels of protection, 
the striking of a balance in avoiding different kinds of statistical errors. Precaution can also be 
relevant here in setting requirements for what are often wrongly asserted in simplistic singular 
terms as ‘the burden of proof’ [144] – promoting distinct consideration for contrasting aspects 
 13 
relating to necessary strengths of evidence, levels of proof, onūs of persuasion and responsibilities 
for resourcing analysis in respect of the diverse contexts encompassed in Figure 1.  
 
An Indicative Practical Framework  
The bulk of this chapter has been taken up in explaining why so many conventional criticisms – and, 
indeed, implementations – of the precautionary principle are quite seriously mistaken and 
misleading. Of necessity, despite the attention to practical methods in Figure 1, much of the 
discussion has been quite general in scope. This leaves a danger, that the picture presented here of 
the role of precaution in regulatory appraisal might be perceived to be rather abstract. So (albeit in 
limited space), there is a need to end this account on a more specific, concrete and constructive note.  
Central to this, is the key challenge of how in practice to implement the diversity of precautionary 
approaches to uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance (like those illustrated in Figure 1), and 
articulate them together in a more broad-based process of appraisal? Drawing on a body of recent 
theoretical empirical and methodological work (e.g.: [96][83][92]), Table 1 summarises a series of 
key considerations, which together help in responding to this challenge. Each represents a general 
quality, of a kind that should be displayed in any process of technology appraisal that may 
legitimately be considered to be precautionary in a general sense. Each is briefly illustrated by 
reference to an example drawn from regulatory experience. In many ways, the qualities listed in 
Table 1 are simply common sense. As befits their general nature, they apply equally to the 
implementation of any approach to technology appraisal, including risk assessment. This 
underscores that precaution represents an enhancement, rather than a contradiction, of accepted 
principles of scientific rigour under uncertainty. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Of course, important questions remain over the extent to which fully implementing the diversity of 
methods shown indicatively in Figure 1 is possible in existing institutional contexts in a fashion that 
displays all the qualities summarised in Table 1. There may be greater confidence over forestalling 
costs of environmental or health risks that might have been missed in risk assessment. But this may 
incur more immediate and visible demands on money, attention, time and evidence in regulatory 
appraisal. So precaution does present real dilemmas for the design of regulatory practice. Such 
questions require more constructive discussions than is evident in much current polarised debate 
over precaution.  
This final section of this chapter, will therefore sketch as an illustrative basis for discussion, one 
concrete procedural framework by means of which a variety of specific methods might readily be 
implemented in the regulatory appraisal of emerging technologies, such as to more fully respect the 
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intractabilities of incertitude and the imperatives of precaution. Building on recent analysis and 
adapted from a series of stakeholder deliberations [145], Figure 2 offers a stylised outline of an 
illustrative general framework for the articulation of conventional risk in a procedural design that 
offers some prospect of doing justice to the challenges of precaution [100].  
By providing for an initial screening process, this deals with concerns over proportionality in 
appraisal. Always under review, only the most appropriate issues are allocated to treatment by more 
broad-based (and onerous) processes of precautionary appraisal. Subject to a set of detailed screening 
criteria applied in stakeholder deliberation, contrasting cases and aspects are variously allocated to 
more inclusive and participatory forms of appraisal (in the case of ambiguity) or more 
straightforward and familiar forms of risk assessment (where these are held to be sufficient). In this 
way, established notions of proportionality are reconciled with precaution, through the employment 
of more targeted approaches to appraisal. Since the screening applies to all cases, the resulting 
analytic-deliberative framework as a whole remains precautionary [146]. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Of course, these kinds of operational framework can look highly schematic and instrumental. If too 
simplistic an impression is given of the underlying challenges, then they can even be 
counterproductive. A fear is, that their compatibility with existing practices may simply serve to 
reinforce current institutional inadequacies. However, by respecting some of the key underlying 
imperatives, such frameworks at least refute the blanket assertions over the non-operational status 
of precaution [97]. They offer a way to provoke greater policy attention to crucial wider political 
issues concerning the governance of science and technology [147]. 
In summary there are two important general promises for the regulation of emerging technologies, 
that are offered in these kinds of emerging frameworks for more precautionary appraisal. These are, 
first, to help ‘broaden out’ attention to greater diversities of options, practices and perspectives in 
policy debates over technology [148]. Secondly, there is the promise of ‘opening up’ more vibrant, 
mature and robust policy debates over the implications of different interpretations of uncertainty 
[99]. Neither of these implies any necessary conflict between precaution and innovation [122]. Nor 
is there any tension between precaution and science [149]. Understood in terms less coloured by 
partisan interests, the precautionary principle can thereby be recognised simply to point to a range 
of practical regulatory tools, through which to better address the unavoidable (if often neglected) 
challenges of incomplete knowledge. By helping to reduce intensities of regulatory capture [150], 
the main contributions of such approaches are to encourage more robust methods in appraisal, make 
value judgements more explicit, and enhance qualities of deliberation.  
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It is in these senses, that a further quality of precaution comes to the fore, in keeping with its 
canonical formulation as part of the formative wider injunctions of the 1992 Rio Declaration [52]. 
Reflecting decades of struggle by social movements against incumbent patterns of privilege and 
power in the orienting of science and technology, various forms of the precautionary principle serve 
in many specific ways, to help foster more transparent and deliberate democratic decision making 
concerning the steering of alternative directions for innovation [120][151]. It is the momentous 
political pressures generated by this dynamic, that (intentionally or inadvertently) make criticism so 
intense. And this is why the precautionary principle is so important. By contrast with the 
technocratic procedures of risk assessment, precaution is about greater democracy under 
uncertainty. 
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